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Abstract: Environmental concerns make enterprises pay more attention to green manufacturing. The
emerging green supply chain inevitably will compete with the traditional supply chain. In order
to evaluate the competitiveness of supply chains and the impact on channel structure strategy, we
develop four game models for two competing supply chains according to their channel structure
strategies. Green marginal manufacturing cost, demand sensitivity of green level, and governmental
interventions are considered. We study how retail prices, green levels, and profits are influenced
by channel structure choice and governmental interventions. Analytical results indicate that
the substitutability of products affects channel structure strategy. When the substitutability of
products is relatively low, centralization–centralization is the unique Nash equilibrium. However,
when the substitutability of products is relatively high, both centralization–centralization and
decentralization–decentralization are the Nash equilibriums. Centralization–centralization is a
prisoner dilemma, while decentralization–decentralization can make the green supply chain achieve
optimal profit. Then, the green marginal manufacturing cost and demand sensitivities of the green
level play important but different roles in channel structure strategy of the competing supply chains.
Further, whether Nash equilibriums are the optimal strategy depends on governmental intervention.
Relatively severe governmental intervention might realize a relatively higher green level, but may
not always achieve the lowest retail price for the green supply chain. However, a relatively moderate
governmental intervention might achieve a relatively lower green level.
Keywords: green supply chain; governmental intervention; channel competition; green cost structure;
game theory
1. Introduction
With the increasing concerns on environmental issues, many enterprises have undergone greening
in practice, e.g., GE, Lenovo, and Linglong Tire. Scholars have also conducted extensive research
on green (sustainable) supply chain management, such as the vehicle supply chain (Peterson and
Michalek [1]), the food supply chain (Nakandala and Lau [2]), and the shipping supply chain (De et al. [3]
and De et al. [4]). In the circumstances where the green supply chain (GSC) and the traditional supply
chain (TSC) coexist, there is inevitable competition between them for the substitutability of products.
The competition between supply chains affects the pricing and green level decisions of channel members
and further influences the channel structure strategy of supply chains. The most common vertical
channel structures are centralization and decentralization [5]. A centralized structure means channel
members act as a whole, while in a decentralized structure, channel members act independently.
Clearly, for two competing supply chains, one supply chain’s channel structure will affect the other
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supply chain’s channel structure choice. Therefore, a more thorough understanding of how the
competition between GSC and TSC affects their channel structure strategies and their profitability is
necessary and interesting, which is the content of our research.
Because green products require higher manufacturing and investment costs than traditional
ones, GSC often has disadvantages in competition with TSC when providing substitute products.
In order to encourage the development of GSC, governments may enact incentive regulations or
policies in favor of green supply chains. Governments usually subsidize GSCs and penalize TSCs. For
example, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 provides a tax credit of USD 2500 per
plug-in hybrid electric vehicle sold (a minimum of 4 kWh battery capacity) and an additional USD
417 for each additional kWh of battery capacity above 4 kWh [6]. The Chinese government levies
taxes on enterprises whose products are not up to environmental standards (Ministy of Ecoology
and Environment of the People’s Republic of China. Available online: http://www.mee.gov.cn/).
Governmental interventions have important effects on the competition of these supply chains, which
further affects a supply chain’s channel structure strategy. One of the main objectives of this paper is to
investigate the impact of governmental interventions on channel structure strategy and the equilibrium
solutions of the supply chains, and further study what interventions can realize the optimal equilibrium
and promote the development of GSC efficiently.
For green products, the first and most important step is the design stage. So, when a manufacturer
produces or sells its products, the design step is often finished. For that reason, some studies treat the
green level as an exogenous parameter. More generally, enterprises may take the design, production,
and sale cycle of green products as a whole process. That is when they design their green products,
they have already considered the production and sale stages. This motivates us to research the effect of
the endogenous green level on the channel structure strategies of competing supply chains. Moreover,
raw materials play a vital role in the production and consumption of green products. Generally, the
higher the green level, the higher the quality of raw materials. In other words, the higher the green
level, the higher the unit production cost and the retail price. Green marginal manufacturing cost
(GMMC) increases the competition between supply chains, and further affects the channel structure
strategy. Therefore, it is of great significance to study the effect of the cost structure of green products
on channel structure strategy.
In addition, environmental awareness changes consumer’s purchasing behavior. There are some
convincing evidences that consumers are more willing to buy environmentally friendly products than
before [7]. For example, as carried out by European Commission in 2008, 75% of Europeans are ready
to buy green products even if they cost a little more, up from 31% in 2005 [8]. That is, consumers have
different demand sensitivities to green and traditional products. Generally speaking, the increase
of consumers’ demand for green products is greater than the decrease in the demand for traditional
products for each additional green level of products. Therefore, the other focus of this paper is to
investigate the influence of the consumer’s environmental awareness and purchasing behavior on
channel structure strategy of supply chains.
Specifically, this paper investigates the channel structure strategy of two competing supply chains
(GSC and TSC) under governmental interventions. Considering the GMMC and green consumers’
demand sensitivity to green level (DSGL), GSC and TSC choose their own channel structures: a
centralized or decentralized structure. We try to answer the following research questions: Given the
competitor is centralized, what structure is better for GSC or TSC? Vice versa, what channel structure
is better if the competitor is decentralized? Further, which channel structure is the Nash Equilibrium?
How do the key variables (such as GMMC, the endogenicity of the green level, and governmental
intervention) affect the channel structure? Moreover, which channel structure is beneficial for the
environment or consumers? To answer these questions, we established four game models to analyze
the competition between GSC and TSC under four combinations of channel structures, respectively.
We find that both centralization–centralization (CC) and decentralization–decentralization (DD) are
possibly the Nash equilibriums, which depend on the channel competition between supply chains
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when the green level is exogenous. However, when the green level is endogenous, numerical results
show that governmental interventions (green level floor and adjustment factor) play important but
different roles in channel structure strategy for both GSC and TSC. Further, the CC scenario may not
realize the optimal profits for the two supply chains, while the DD scenario might make the GSC
achieve the maximum profit. In addition, relatively stringent governmental intervention is necessary
for the development of GSC.
2. Literature Review
This work is closely related to green supply chain management (GSCM), channel competition,
channel structure strategy, and governmental intervention for supply chains.
2.1. Green Supply Chain Management
The literature of GSCM focuses on how supply chains make their strategies to not only increase
competitiveness to further capture additional market share, but also protect the environment. Studies
about GSCM mainly focus on two aspects: product recycling or reverse logistics, and making green
products with a low environmental cost. This study is related to the latter aspect. Many researchers
have conducted relevant studies on green products. For instance, Tseng et al. [9] evaluate green
innovation practices focusing on managerial, process, product, and technology innovation. Biswas
and Roy [10] study the impact of consumer behavior on the emerging economy by exploratory study
with the green product. Fang et al. [11] refine influencing factors of the formation and evolution of
collaborative innovation networks and the evolution indicators of green innovations performance.
Seman et al. [12] examine the mediating effect of green innovation on the relationship between GSCM
and environmental performance. Yu et al. [13] investigate the relationships between supply chain
quality integration, GSCM, and environmental performance and establish a structural equation model
using the data collected from 308 manufacturing companies in China. Chen et al. [14] study the reverse
logistics pricing strategy of a GSC from the view of customers’ environmental awareness. Different
from the above literature that treats green levels as an input parameter, some studies treat it as a
decision variable. For example, from the consumer’s perspective, Zhang et al. [6] investigate the
impact of consumer environmental awareness (CEA) on order quantities and channel coordination.
Ghosh and Shah [15] explore cooperation issues and examine the impact of cost-sharing contracts on
the key decisions of GSC players. Chen et al. [16] investigate joint decisions on production and pricing
for green crowdfunding products of different quality levels. By introducing competing products,
Zhang et al. [17] consider the coordination strategy of a green supply chain with hybrid production
mode. Jian et al. [18] study a multi-objective optimization model of GSC by considering environmental
benefits. Motivated by the studies, we treat green level as an exogenous parameter at first to investigate
the impact of the competitiveness on the channel structure strategy of supply chains. Then, we treat
it as an endogenous variable to study the effect of green level and the cost structure on the channel
structure strategies of supply chains. Considering green level in the context of channel structure
strategy is another contribution of this paper.
2.2. Channel Competition
Channel competition has become more evident because competition in markets is now shifting
from the competition between enterprises to the competition between channels [19]. Since McGuire
and Staelin [20] first considered a price competition between two suppliers and explored the effect of
product substitutability on optimal retailer distribution, channel competition has become an interesting
topic. For instance, Wu et al. [21] studied bargaining in competing supply chains with demand
uncertainty. Majumder and Srinivasan [22] studied the competition and leadership of network
supply chains. Chakraborty et al. [23] investigated the cost-sharing mechanism for product quality
improvement in a supply chain under competition. Wang and Liu [24] studied vertical contract
selection under chain-to-chain service competition in a shipping supply chain. The above literature
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studies the competition between TSCs. As green products occupy more shares in the market, the
competition of GSCs with multiple products attracts increasing attention. For example, Zhang et al. [7]
developed a multi-product newsvendor model for a supply chain manufacturing green and non-green
products under competitive and cooperative situations. By considering competitive scenario, Yalabik
and Fairchild [25] examined the effects of consumer, regulatory, and competitive pressure on firm
investments in environmentally-friendly production. Compared with the existing literature focusing on
the multi-product supply chain, this paper emphasizes the channel structure strategy with multi-chains
under governmental intervention. Nobari et al. [26] studied a chain-to-chain competition between two
supply chains using a multi-objective mathematical model. Li and Li [27] studied the game model and
the equilibrium structures of two reverse supply chains under competition in product sustainability.
Unlike Nobari et al. [26] and Li and Li [27], we mainly focus on the impacts of the substitutability of
products and governmental interventions on the channel structure strategy of competing GSC and TSC.
Further, we consider different prices of competing products, which is also different from Li and Li [27].
2.3. Channel Structure Strategy
Since Spengler first considered the channel structure of supply chains in 1950 [28], researchers
have studied this topic extensively. Generally, there are two channel structures vertically in a supply
chain: centralization and decentralization. From the traditional viewpoint, because of the double
marginalization effect, a centralized strategy is more conducive to supply chains than a decentralized
strategy. For example, Spengler [28] believes that concentration could improve the performance of a
supply chain. With the deepening of the research, scholars have considered various factors and believe
that a decentralized supply chain can achieve or even exceed the performance of a centralized supply
chain. For example, Su and Zhang [29] believe that a decentralized supply chain under a wholesale
price contract has a higher performance than a centralized supply chain under the consideration
of strategic consumers. Liu and Tyagi [30] studied the impact of upstream supply chain channel
decentralization on the supply chain when competitive enterprises can outsource production to their
upstream suppliers. Results show that when the production is endogenous, downstream enterprises
can still benefit from the decentralized channels of the upstream. Zhao and Shi [31] studied the channel
structure strategy of supply chains under competition with multiple suppliers and a single retailer.
Results show that decentralization is better when competition is fierce. However, centralization is
better when there are multiple vendors. Some studies have considered the environmental impact of
supply chains when discussing supply chain channel strategy. Xia et al. [32] examined service level and
distribution channel decisions for competing supply chains with a focus on how service competition
affects the channel structure. Xing et al. [33] investigated the channel structure of a GSC in the context
of competition. Results showed that when the potential market size of traditional products is small or
substitutability of products is high, decentralization is better for traditional manufacturers; otherwise,
traditional manufacturers will choose a centralized strategy. However, green manufacturers will
always choose a centralized strategy. The research of Bian et al. [34] showed that, unlike the traditional
double marginalization effect, a monopolistic manufacturer benefits from the decentralization when
the environment is sufficiently polluted by its manufacturing technology. In some cases, decentralized
manufacturers can benefit from tax reductions. Inspired by the debates on channel structures, this
study investigates the channel structure strategy of two competing supply chains (GSC and TSC),
considering the green product cost structure and governmental two-way interventions. This study
differs from Xing et al. [33] and Bian et al. [34]. Xing et al. [33] emphasized the effect of market size and
substitutability of products but did not consider a green product manufacturing cost increase with its
green level and governmental intervention. However, Bian et al. [34] studied the distribution channel
strategies of monopolistic manufacturers and emphasized an environmental tax but no subsidy.
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2.4. Governmental Intervention
Governmental intervention has been widely considered in GSC in recent years. However, the
impact of governmental intervention on supply chain competition appears to be controversial. Some
researchers insist that government intervention can be beneficial for the development of the GSC. For
example, Sheu and Chen [35] analyzed the effects of governmental intervention on GSC competition by
using a three-stage game model. Numerical results revealed that social welfare and chain-based profits
can be improved by 27.8% and 306.6%, respectively, compared with the case without intervention.
Atasu and Wassenhove [36] studied the implications of environmental legislation on the collection
and recycling of used electrical and electronics products. Ghazanfari et al. [37] studied the impact of
government incentives on the fresh-product supply chain. Results show that government incentives can
increase the profit of all members. However, others hold the opposite view; they think governmental
intervention may be detrimental to the competition between supply chains. For example, Sheu [38]
investigated the negotiations between producers and reverse-logistics suppliers for cooperative
agreements under government intervention. Results indicated that government intervention may
result in adverse effects on profits and social welfare. Besides, Droste et al. [39] investigated institutional
conditions facilitating the transition towards a green economy of government intervention. Madani
and Rasti-Barzoki [40] considered the role of government and interactions between the government
and supply chain members’ decisions. Li et al. [41] investigated the issues of the recycling and
remanufacturing of the construction of a closed-loop supply chain; results showed that governmental
regulations could effectively increase the recycling amount. Liu and Nishi [42] stated that government
intervention could influence the market demands and return rates. Ma et al. [43] studied the method
to drive green innovation, and the results show that the government should subsidize both the retailer
and the manufacturer to improve the green innovation level. Yang and Xiao [44] studied the role of
governmental intervention in GSC under different channel power scenarios. Dixit et al. [45] investigated
government-supported health-care supply chain enablers in rural areas of India to minimize wastage of
generic medicines. Government subsidies are conducive to promoting green innovation in enterprises.
Choi and Luo [46] studied government sponsor schemes and environment taxation waiving schemes
on data quality of a sustainable fashion supply chain. Guo et al. [47] reported that high levels
of government subsidies can weaken the relationship of financial slack and R&D investment but
strengthen the relationship of R&D investment and firm performance. From the above controversial
arguments, it is necessary to investigate how government intervention affects green levels and retail
prices of competing supply chains under different channel structures. Furthermore, what role will
governmental intervention play in the competition and the equilibrium results?
By investigating the roles of the substitutability of products and consumer demand sensitivity
to green levels (DSGL) in competing supply chains under different channel structure strategies, and
examining the impact of governmental intervention and green marginal manufacturing cost (GMMC)
on the development of GSC, this work bridges between behavioral decision theory and GSCM. Unlike
the extant literature, we model the impact of government intervention on channel structure strategy
and study how channel structure strategy depends on the intervention, GMMC, and consumers’ DSGL.
Our findings show that substitutability of products affects the channel structure strategy of both GSC
and TSC. Government intervention, GMMC, and consumers’ DSGL play important but different roles
in channel structure strategies and pricing and green level decisions of the competing supply chains.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 3 briefly introduces the problem formulation
and notations. Section 4 analyzes the equilibrium strategies under different channel structure scenarios
with an exogenous green level. Section 5 analyses the equilibrium strategies under different channel
structure scenarios with endogenous green levels and provides numerical examples. Section 6
summarizes the results and indicates future research directions.
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3. Problem Formulation and Notations
Consider two supply chains: the GSC and TSC. Each supply chain is composed of one manufacturer
and one retailer. They produce products (green or traditional ones) and sell them to consumers through
the retailer. The government adopts different policies to supply chains, provides subsidies to the
GSC and punishment to the TSC. Supply chains compete on prices and the green levels of products.
They have two strategies: centralized or decentralized strategies. When supply chains choose a
decentralized strategy, in more cases, the manufacturer enjoys sufficient power as the channel leader
who can anticipate the retailer’s response and make decisions, and the retailer is the follower. However,
when supply chains choose a centralized strategy, as a whole, the manufacturer and retailer are
co-determination makers.
This paper investigates the channel structure strategy of two competing supply chains (GSC and
TSC). Especially, we analyze the impacts of substitutability and cost structures of products on channel
structure strategy. Under different channel structure strategies, manufacturers and retailers make
decisions maximizing their own or the whole supply chain’s profits. The business flow of the two
supply chains competition decision is shown in Figure 1.
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Figure 1. The business flow of a supply chain (SC)’s competition decision.
We have the following notations.
pg, pt: retail price of green and traditional products, which is a supply chain or retailer’s decision
variable, pg, pt ≥ 0;
wg,: unit wholesale price of green and traditional products, which is the manufacturers’
decision variable;
g: green level f a product, which is the GSC or green manufacturer’ d cision v riable, g ≥ 0;
c: marginal manufacturing cost sensitivity of a green product;
Dg, Dt: consumer demands for green and traditional products;
a˜: the market scale of the product;
λ1, λ2: consumer’s sensitivity parameter of green levels to green or traditional products’ demands;
pigm, pinm: green and traditional manufacturer’s profits;
pigr, pinr: green and traditional retailer’s profits;
pigsc, pinsc: the total profits of GSC and TSC, which is the sum of the manufacturer’s and
retailer’s profits.
Similar to Madani and Rasti-Barzoki [40] and Ghosh and Shah [48], we assume that consumer
demands are depende t o the retail price of the product itself, the retail price of a competing product,
and the green level in a tractable form of linear expression. Specifically, consumer demands are
negatively related to the retail price of the product itself but positively related to the retail price of the
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competing product. Similarly, the green level has a positive impact on consumer demand of green
products, but a negative impact on the demand of a traditional one. Consumer demands are as follows
Dg = ag − pg + bpn + λ1g (1)
Dt = at − pt + bpg − λ2g (2)
where ag = ρa, at= (1 − ρ)a are basic market sizes of green and traditional products. ρ is consumer
loyalty to GSC, 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. b is sensitivity coefficient of the cross-price to consumer demands, 0 ≤ b ≤ 1.
λ1 > λ2 reflects that the impact of green level on green product’s demand is greater than the demand
for traditional products.
This demand function assumption is different from Li and Li [27], in which the prices of
competing products are given and the same. This assumption is also different from Bian et al. [34], in
which consumer demand is assumed to be the function of retail price only and the manufacturer’s
environmental concerns are expressed in the objective function by assigning a weight to the
environmental damage.
For simplicity, we make the following modeling assumptions:
A1. Following Yang and Xiao [44], the government offers subsidies to green manufacturers for
producing each unit green product s = kg0(g − g0), where g0 is the green level floor for subsidy, k
is the government’s adjustment factor of offering a subsidy to the green manufacturer. Taking into
account many other decision factors, when g > g0, the manufacturer has the behavioral tendencies
to increase the subsidy; however, when g < g0, the manufacturer has the behavioral tendencies to
risk the punishment. For using the threshold level to represent behavioral tendency, see De et al. [49].
Especially for traditional products, since the green level is zero, according to this assumption, the
government punishes by −kg20 for every unit of traditional product.
Actually, a subsidy is often related to the green level g and the green level floor g0. Generally,
a green level floor g0 for subsidy is also needed. According to government policy, the higher the green
level g, the more the subsidy s will be. For example, in the standard of energy-saving air conditioning,
there are 500–850 and 300–650 CNY subsidy to per unit of energy-saving air conditioning of primary and
secondary levels, respectively (National development and reform commission of the People’s Republic
of China. Available online: http://xwzx.ndrc.gov.cn/mtfy/dfmt/200907/t20090728_293093.html). In
addition, when the total subsidy is certain, if the government raises the green level floor of subsidy,
which means that less air conditioners can obtain the subsidy, the unit subsidy rises consequently. For
traditional products, because of the relatively higher environmental cost, the government collects fixed
taxation generally.
A2. The cost of a green manufacturer consists of two parts: the fixed investment cost I and
the marginal manufacturing cost C. They are both positively related to the green level g. Similar to
Banker et al. [50], we assume I = µg2/2. The fixed investment cost I increases and is convex to the
green level g, which means that when the green level is relatively high, green manufacturing becomes
more difficult. µ is the marginal investment cost when the green product is at a unit of green level.
Following Yang et al. [51], raw materials play a vital role in a green product’s manufacturing process,
that is, the higher the green level, the higher the cost of raw materials, and the higher the marginal
cost of the product. Accordingly, we assume C = cg, where c is the increase in the manufacturing
cost when the green manufacturer improves the green level by one unit. For example, green furniture
manufacturers often purchase wood from regenerate forests. Moreover, green clothing manufacturers
use organic cotton as raw material [46]. This assumption considers the additional cost caused by the
improvement of green levels, which is different from most studies such as Zhang et al. [17], Li and
Li [27], Xing et al. [33], and Bian et al. [34] where they have assumed that manufacturing cost is a fixed
and given parameter.
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From the above description and analyses, the membership profits of the competing supply chains
are as follows:
pigm = (wg − cg + kg0(g− g0))Dg − µg
2
2
(3)
pigr = (pg −wg)Dg (4)
pitm = (wt − kg20)Dt (5)
pitr = (pt −wt)Dt (6)
The channel total profits of the competing supply chains can be written as
pigsc = (pg − cg + kg0(g− g0))Dg − µg
2
2
(7)
pitsc = (pt − kg20)Dt (8)
Before analyzing the Nash equilibrium of channel structure strategies, we first explain the concept
of Nash equilibrium. In a game, no matter what the other party’s strategy is, each party will choose
a certain strategy, called the dominant strategy. If the combination of the strategies of two players
in a game constitutes their respective dominant strategies, the combination of these two strategies
is defined as a Nash equilibrium (reference). In our context, the channel structure strategy has two
options: centralization and decentralization. Two supply chains can choose either option, which gives
rise to four channel structure scenarios.
In the following, we first study the pricing and green level decisions and profits under the four
channel structure scenarios, respectively. Then we examine the impact of the competition between
green and traditional products on the equilibrium outcomes. Finally, we give numerical examples to
generate more managerial insights.
4. Equilibrium Strategies Analyses under Different Channel Structure Scenarios with Exogenous
Green Level
In this section, we investigate equilibrium prices and profits under four channel structure models
(CC, DD, DC, and CD scenarios) when the green level is exogenous. We use superscript i to represent the
equilibrium outcomes under model i, i = CC, DD, DC, and CD. Further, we compare the equilibrium
profits under different channel structure scenarios and obtain Nash equilibrium strategies, optimal
prices and green levels, and its conditions.
4.1. Equilibrium Decisions under the CC Scenario
When the two competing supply chains both choose a centralized structure, they set their retail
prices to maximize the channels’ profits simultaneously.
The game model can be solved by using the backwards induction. From Equations (7) and (8), we
can derive Proposition 1. See Appendix A.
Proposition 1. Under the CC scenario, the equilibrium decisions are as follows:
pCC∗g =
(2ρ+ b(1− ρ))a + (2c + 2λ1 − bλ2 − 2kg0)g + B00
4− b2
pCC∗t =
(bρ+ 2(1− ρ))a + (bc + bλ1 − 2λ2 − bkg0)g + B00
4− b2
where B00= (2 + b)kg20.
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Proposition 1 shows the green and traditional supply chains’ pricing decisions in the CC scenario.
From the results, we can intuitively obtain that GMMC has a positive impact on the green product’s
retail price. Unexpectedly but interestingly, GMMC also has a positive impact on the retail price of the
traditional product. This is possibly because the competitiveness between supply chains makes the
traditional supply chain increase its retail price when the green product’s retail price is relatively high.
Substituting the equilibrium decisions obtained from Proposition 1 into Equations (7) and (8), the
profits of GSC and TSC (pigsc(p∗g, p∗t) and pitsc(p∗g, p∗t)) under the centralized structure can be obtained,
simplified them as piVV∗gsc and piVV∗tsc .
4.2. Equilibrium Decisions under the DD Scenario
Under the DD scenario, the time sequence of this game is as follows:
(i) Manufacturers of the two supply chains announce their wholesale prices of green or traditional
products simultaneously.
(ii) After observing the wholesale prices, retailers of the two supply chains announce their retail
prices of green or traditional products.
From Equations (3)–(6), using the backwards induction, we can derive Proposition 2.
Proposition 2. Under the DD scenario, the equilibrium decisions are as follows:
(a) The wholesale prices are
wDD∗g =
B10 + B11b ++B12b2 + B13b3 + B14b4
16− 17b2 + 4b4
wDD∗t =
B20 + B21b + B22b2 + B23b3 + B24b4
16− 17b2 + 4b4
(b) The retail prices of green and traditional products are
pDD∗g =
1
(−4 + b2)
(
2B10 + b(2B11 + B20) + b2(2B12 + B21) + b3(2B13 + B22) + b4(2B14 + B23) + b5B24
(16− 17b2 + 4b4)
)
pDD∗t =
1
(−4 + b2)
(
2B10 + b(B10 + 2B21) + b2(B11 + 2B22) + b3(B12 + 2B23) + b4(B13 + 2B24) + b5B14
(16− 17b2 + 4b4)
)
where B10 = 8(aρ+ cg− gg0k + g20k− gλ1), B11 = 6a(1− ρ)+2g20k− 6gλ2,
B12 = −3aρ− 8cg + 8gg0k− 8g20k− 3gλ1, B13 = −2a(1− ρ)− g20k− 2gλ2, B14 = 2cg− 2gg0k + 2g20k,
B20 = 8(a(1 + ρ) + g20k− gλ2), B21 = 6aρ+ 2(cg− gg0k + g20k + 3gλ1),
B22 = −3a(1− ρ) − 8g20k + 3gλ2, B23 = −2aρ− cg + gg0k− g20k− 2gλ1, B24 = 2g20k.
Substituting the equilibrium decisions obtained from Proposition 2 into Equations (3)–(6), profits
of manufacturers and retailers of GSC and TSC under MM structure can be obtained. Further, the
channel total profits of supply chains are obtained, simplified them as piDD∗gsc and piDD∗tsc .
4.3. Equilibrium Decisions under the DC Scenario
Under the DC scenario, the time sequence of this game is as follows:
(i) The green manufacturer announces the green product’s wholesale price; meanwhile, the
traditional manufacturer and the retailer of TSC announce the retail price of the traditional
product simultaneously.
(ii) After observing the green product’s wholesale price and the traditional product’s retail price,
the retailer of GSC announces the retail price of the green product.
From Equations (3), (4), and (8), we derive the following:
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Proposition 3. Under the DC scenario, the equilibrium decisions are as follows:
(a) The retail prices of green and traditional products are
pDC∗g =
1
4− b2 (
B30 + B31b− B32b2
2(2− b2) +(2 + b(1− ρ))a + (2λ1 − bλ2)g + bkg
2
0)
pDC∗n =
1
4− b2 (
b(B30 + B31b− B32b2)
2(2− b2) +(bρ+ 2(1− ρ))a + (bλ1 − 2λ2)g + 2kg
2
0)
(b) Green product’s equilibrium wholesale price is
wDC∗g =
B30 + B31b + B32b2
2(2− b2)
where B30 = 2
(
aρ+ cg− gg0k + g20k + gλ1
)
, B31 = a(1− ρ) + g20k− gλ2, B32 = 2
(
gg0k− cg− g20k
)
4.4. Equilibrium Decisions under the CD Scenario
Under the CD scenario, the time sequence of this game is as follows:
(i) GSC announces the retail price of the green product; meanwhile, the traditional manufacturer
announces the wholesale price of the traditional product.
(ii) After observing the retail price of the green product and the wholesale price of the traditional
product, the retailer of TSC announces the retail price of the traditional product.
From Equations (5)–(7), we derive the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Under the CD scenario, the equilibrium decisions are as follows:
(a) The retail prices of green and traditional products are
pCD∗g =
1
4− b2 (
b(B40 + bB41 + b2B42)
2(2− b2) +(b + (2− b)ρ)a + (2λ1 − bλ2)g + 2cg− 2kgg0 + 2kg
2
0)
pCD∗n =
1
4− b2 (
b(B40 + bB41 + b2B42)
2(2− b2) +(bρ+ 2(1− ρ))a + bcg + (bλ1 − 2λ2)g− bgg0k + bkg
2
0)
(b) The traditional product’s equilibrium wholesale price is
wMV∗g =
B40 + B41b + B42b2
2(2− b2)
where B40 = 2
(
a(1− ρ) − g20k− gλ2
)
, B41 = aρ+ cg− gg0k + g20k + gλ1, B42 = −g20k.
Combining the results of Propositions 1–4, we know that the equilibrium wholesale and retail
prices are dependent on the competitive degree between supply chains. Then, in next subsection, we
mainly investigate the effect of competitive degree on channel structure strategy.
4.5. Channel Structure Strategies Analyses
This subsection compares and analyzes the equilibrium results obtained in Sections 4.1–4.4 under
different channel structures of the two supply chains, and obtains the equilibrium channel structure
of the two supply chains and the key influencing factors. Further, some important management
implications are derived.
Proposition 5. piCC∗gsc > piDC∗gsc , piCC∗nsc > piCD∗nsc .
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From Proposition 5, we know that when TSC chooses a centralized strategy, GSC also chooses a
centralized strategy, and vice versa. That is, for any product competition degree, government policy
and GMMC, CC is always the Nash equilibrium. This finding is consistent with Wu et al. [21], who
insist that CC is the unique Nash equilibrium over one period decision. In practice, a few supply chains
do adopt some coordination mechanisms to induce the supply chain to act as if they are vertically
integrated, such as buy-back, revenue sharing, and quantity flexibility.
Proposition 6. If 0 ≤ b ≤ b1, then piDD∗gsc ≤ piCD∗gsc , piDD∗nsc ≤ piDC∗nsc ;
If b1 < b ≤ 1, then piDD∗gsc > piCD∗gsc , piDD∗nsc > piDC∗nsc .
According to Proposition 6, the following results can be drawn. If GSC chooses a decentralized
strategy, TSC’s strategy depends on the substitutability of products. Specifically, when substitutability
of products is relatively small, concentration is a better strategy. However, when substitutability
of products is relatively large, a decentralized strategy is better, and vice versa. That is, given one
supply chain chooses a decentralized strategy, the other supply chain’s strategy is dependent on the
competition degree of the supply chains. This result is consistent with Wu et al. [21] but different from
Zhang et al. [17]. Zhang et al. [17] insisted that cooperation is always better than non-cooperation. This
is possibly because Zhang et al. [17] considered a single green supply chain with a hybrid production
mode. However, Wu et al. [22] showed that DD may also be at Nash equilibrium over infinitely many
periods. Practically, decentralized supply chains have been commonly observed in a broad range of
industries, such as electronics, pharmaceuticals, and automotive (Zhao and Shi [31]).
From above analyses, if the competition degree of supply chains is relatively small (represented by
the value of b), CC is the unique Nash equilibrium. However, if the competition degree of supply chains
is relatively large, CC and DD are both the Nash equilibriums regardless of government intervention
and other factors.
This section mainly discusses equilibrium decisions and strategies of competing supply chains
under different conditions with an exogenous green level, especially, the effect of product competitive
degree on Nash equilibriums. For investigating the effect of other key factors on channel structure
strategy, in the following section, channel structure scenarios with endogenous green levels will
be considered.
5. Equilibrium Analyses under Different Channel Structure Scenarios with Endogenous
Green Levels
In this section, we investigate equilibrium decisions under different channel structure scenarios
when the green level is endogenous, respectively. Further, numerical analyses compare the equilibrium
profits, prices, and green levels under different scenarios, and obtain channel structure strategies with
respect to government policy and GMMC.
5.1. Equilibrium Decisions under Different Channel Structure Scenarios
When the green level is endogenous, it is a decision variable. In this subsection, we analyze the
equilibrium decisions of different channel structures.
Under the CC scenario, GSC sets the retail price of the green product and the green level, and TSC
sets retail price of the traditional product to maximize their channels’ profits simultaneously.
From Equations (7) and (8), we can derive Proposition 7.
Proposition 7. Under the CC scenario, if µ > µ1 (µ is a green product’s marginal investment cost at unit green
level), there exists optimal equilibrium decisions
(
pCC∗g , gCC∗, pCC∗t
)
, where µ1 =
(λ1+kg)
2
2 .
The assumption µ > µ1 ensures the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium, which is critical for
yielding an analytically tractable solution. Thus, in analyzing the CC scenario, we assume that the condition
µ > µ1 is always satisfied.
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Under the DD scenario, the time sequence is as follows: First, the green manufacturer sets the
wholesale price of the green product and the green level, and the traditional manufacturer sets the
wholesale price of the traditional product to maximize their profits simultaneously. Then, the retailers
of the two supply chains set the retail prices of products.
From Equations (3)–(6), we derive Proposition 8.
Proposition 8. Under the DD scenario, if µ > µ2, there exist optimal equilibrium decisions(
pDD∗g , pDD∗t , w
DD∗
g , wDD∗t , g
DD∗), where µ2 = (2λ1+bλ2+kg0(2−b2))22(2−b2)(4−b2) .
Similar to Proposition 7, the assumption µ > µ2 ensures the existence and uniqueness of the Nash
equilibrium of DD scenario.
Under the DC scenario, the time sequence is as follows: First, the green manufacturer sets the
wholesale price of the green product and the green level. Then, the retailer of GSC sets the retail
price of the green product, and TSC sets the retail price of the traditional product to maximize their
profits simultaneously.
From Equations (3), (4), and (8), we can derive Proposition 9.
Proposition 9. Under the DC scenario, if µ > µ2, there exist optimal equilibrium decisions
(pDC∗g , pDC∗t , w
DC∗
g , gDC∗), where µ1 is given in Proposition 7.
Under DC scenario, the time sequence is as follows: First, the traditional manufacturer sets the
wholesale price of the traditional product. Then, the retailer of TSC sets the retail price of the traditional
product, and GSC sets the green level and the retail price of the green product to maximize their profits.
From Equations (3)–(6), we can derive Proposition 10.
Proposition 10. Under the CD scenario, if µ > µ1, there exist optimal equilibrium decisions
(pCD∗g , gCD∗, pCD∗t , w
CD∗
n ), where µ2 is given in Proposition 8.
Based on the derived equilibrium solutions, qualitative and quantitative analyses are conducted
in the next subsection to provide additional insights into the influence of government interventions
and GMMC on channel structure strategies of green and traditional supply chains.
5.2. Channel Structure Strategy Analysis
Because of the complication of the equilibrium solutions, it is difficult to analyze their relationships
analytically. In order to get more management implications, a numerical example is adopted to
further analyze the channel structure strategies of the competing supply chains when the green level is
endogenous. The influence of some key factors, such as government intervention policy, GMMC, and
DSGL on equilibrium decisions and channel structure strategy are discussed.
We assume that the parameters are as follows: a = 10, b = 0.77, µ = 2, and ρ = 0.6. The effect of
governmental intervention on channel structure strategy is first investigated.
5.2.1. Analysis of Impact of Governmental Intervention on Equilibrium Decisions and Profits
The government sets intervention policies by green level floor g0 and adjustment factor k. We first
investigate the impacts of green level floor g0 on channel structure strategy by analyzing profits of the
GSC and TSC under different governmental interventions.
If c = 0.5, λ1 = 0.7, λ2 = 0.3, k = 1.2, then, from the above discussion in this section, the green
level floor range is 0 ≤ g0 < 1.25. For comparison and analysis, we draw graphs of retail prices, green
levels, and profits of the two supply chains under four structure scenarios, as shown in Figures 2–6.
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From Figures 2–4, we derive the following results.
Firstly, from Figure 2, it is easy to find that the green level floor has a positive impact on the
green level regardless of the channel structure scenarios, which indicates that a relatively high green
level floor is beneficial for the improvement of the green level. Then, the green level is also higher
in centralization than decentralization for GSC. From Figures 3 and 4, the impacts of the green level
floor on the retail prices of both green and traditional products depend on the channel structure.
Interestingly, it displays that the retail prices of both green and traditional products increase with the
green level floor when GSC is in a decentralized structure, but decrease when GSC is in a centralized
structure. Moreover, when the green level floor is relatively low, we have pDD∗t > p
CD∗
t > p
DC∗
t > p
CC∗
t ,
and when green level floor is relatively high, we have pDD∗t > p
DC∗
t > p
CD∗
t > p
CC∗
t . As for the green
product, for any green level floor, we have pDD∗g > pDC∗g > pCD∗g > pCC∗g .
Secondly, the green level floor has a positive impact on the profits of GSC but a negative impact
on TSC generally. Then from Figure 5, for GSC, when green level floor is relatively low, we have the
following results: piCD∗gsc > piDD∗gsc > piCC∗gsc > piDC∗gsc ; however, when green level floor is relatively high, we
have piDD∗gsc > piCD∗gsc > piCC∗gsc > piDC∗gsc . That is, when TSC is centralized, GSC will also choose centralization.
But when TSC is decentralized, GSC’s choice depends on the green level floor. Specifically, when the
green level floor is relatively low, centralization is a better choice, but when green level floor is relatively
high, decentralization is better. Similarly, for TSC, when the green level floor is relatively low, we have
piDD∗tsc > pi
DC∗
tsc > pi
CC∗
tsc > pi
CD∗
tsc ; however, when green level floor is relatively high, we have pi
DC∗
tsc > pi
DD∗
tsc
> piCC∗tsc > pi
CD∗
tsc . In other words, when GSC is centralized, TSC will also choose centralization. But
when GSC is decentralized, GSC’s choice also depends on the green level floor. Different from GSC,
a relatively low green level floor may result in a decentralized choice of TSC.
According to the above analysis, the following managerial insights are obtained:
(1.1) CC is always the Nash equilibrium. This result is consistent with Li and Li [28]. However,
Nash equilibrium CC may not realize optimal green levels, but consumers can obtain the lowest retail
prices from both GSC and TSC.
(1.2) The green level floor plays different roles in the channel structure choice of GSC and TSC.
When the competitor is decentralized, a relatively high green level floor may result in a centralized
choice of TSC but a decentralized choice of GSC. However, a relatively low green level floor may result
in a decentralized choice of TSC but a centralized choice of GSC. This is an extension of the result of Li
and Li [28].
For investigating the impact of adjustment factor k on channel structure strategies, we assume
g0 = 1. The other parameters are same as the above. From discussion in Section 5.1, the range of
adjustment factors is 0 ≤ k ≤ 1.62. Similarly, we depict the profits of the two supply chains under
different structure scenarios, as shown in Figures 7 and 8.
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From Figures 7 and 8, we can obtain the following results.
Firstly, adjustment factor k has a positive impact on the profits of GSC regardless of the channel
structure. But the impact of adjustment factor k on TSC depends on the channel structure. When TSC
is centralized, the impact is negative. Otherwise, the impact is positive. This finding is different from
Madani and Rasti-Barzoki [40], who consider that the government tax rate always decreases the profit
of the TSC. This is because Madani and Rasti-Barzoki [40] did not consider the channel structure in
their model. Then, neither GSC nor TSC can maximize their own profit in Nash equilibrium CC. In
Nash equilibrium DD, whether the GSC and the TSC can realize their optimal profits depends on
the adjustment factor. When the adjustment factor is rel tively low, we have the following results:
piCD∗gsc > piDD∗gsc > piCC∗gsc > piDC∗gsc and piDD∗tsc > pi
DC∗
tsc > pi
CC∗
tsc > pi
CD∗
tsc , but when the adjust factor is relatively
high, we have piDD∗gsc > piCD∗gsc > piCC∗gsc > piDC∗gsc and piDC∗tsc > pi
DD∗
tsc > pi
CC∗
tsc > pi
CD∗
tsc . It means that when the
competitor is decentralized, both GSC and TSC’s optimal choice is related to the adjustment factor.
A relatively high adjustment factor may make GSC choose a decentralized structure, but make TSC
choose a centralized structure.
From the analysis, some managerial insights can be obtained:
(1.3) Adjustment factor k plays a vital role in channel structure strategy of both GSC and TSC
when the opposite is decentralized. If the adjustment factor is relatively high, a decentralized structure
is a better choice for GSC, but if the adjust factor is relatively low, centralization is better for GSC. As
for TSC, the choice is the opposite.
5.2.2. Analysis of Impact of GMMC on Equilibrium Decisions and Profits
In this subsection, we analyze the impact of GMMC (green marginal manufacturing cost) on
the equilibrium decisions and channel structure strategy. We consider the difference in retail prices,
green levels, and the profits of GSC and TSC under different channel structure scenarios when GMMC
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varies and when governmental intervention is as follows: g0 = 1, k = 1.2. The other parameters are as
same as those in Section 5.2.1. The change of the key variables and the expected profits are shown in
Figures 9–12.
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Remark 1. The following results can be obtained from Figures 9–12:
(1) From Figures 9 and 10, the GMMC has a negative impact on green levels, which is an intuitive result.
But counter-intuitively, different from the centralized scenario, when GSC is decentralized, the retail price of
the green product decreases slightly with the GMMC. This is possibly because decentralization increases the
competitiveness of GSC.
(2) From Figures 11 and 12, it is straightforward that GMMC has a negative impact on GSC but a positive
impact on TSC. In other words, a relatively high GMMC is unfavorable for GSC in competition. In addition,
when the competitor is centralized, the effect of the GMMC on channel structure strategy may not be evident
for the two supply chains. However, when the competitor is decentralized, both GSC and TSC’s strategies are
dependent on the GMMC. Specifically, when the competitor is decentralized, if the GMMC is relatively low, the
GSC’s best choice may also be decentralization; if the GMMC is relatively high, the GSC’s best choice would be
centralization. From Figure 12, the impact of the GMMC on TSC’s channel structure strategy may be just the
opposite to its impact on TSC.
5.2.3. Analysis of Impact of DSGLs on Equilibrium Profits
In this subsection, we want to analyze the influence of DSGLs. We examine the impact of DSGLs
on equilibrium outcomes and profits of supply chains under the four channel structure scenarios. We
vary green and traditional products’ DSGLs, λ1 and λ2, and take the other parameters as in Section 5.2.1.
The change of key variables and the profits are shown in Figures 13–16.
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Remark 2. The following results can be obtained from Figures 13–16:
(1) Fro igures 13 and 14, the DSGL λ1 has a positive impact on GSC regardless of the channel s ructure;
however, the impact of the DSGL λ1 on TSC depends on the channel structure. Specifically, when the GSC is
decentralized, the higher the DSGL λ1, the more the TSC’s profit. When the GSC is centralized, the higher the
DSGL λ1, the less the TSC’s profit. In addition, the DSGL λ1 has an important impact on both the GSC and the
TSC’s channel structure strat gies. From Figure 13, it is obtai ed that when TSC is decentralized, a relatively
low DSGL λ1 may prompt GSC to choose a decentralization strategy; however, a relatively high DSGL λ1 may
make GSC tend to centralization. An opposite choice can be obtained for the TSC from Figure 14.
(2) From Figures 15 and 16, the DSGL λ2 has a negative impact on both GSC and TSC’s profits. However,
the DSGL λ2 also plays an important role on the GSC and the TSC’s channel structure strategies. Different from
DSGL λ1, w en TSC is decentralized, a relatively l w DSGL λ2 may make GSC prefer ntralization; howeve ,
a relatively high DSGL λ2 may make GSC prefer decentralization. Similar results for TSC can be observed from
Figure 16.
6. Conclusions
This paper investigates the competition between GSC and TSC, considering the influence of
government intervention and GMMC on channel competition and channel strategy. By analyzing
four game theoretical models corresponding to different combinations of channel structure strategies
for two supply chains, this paper discusses channel structure strategy and the key influential factors
under the competition of GSC and TSC and governmental interventions with both endogenous and
exogenous green degrees and further analyzes the condition of the equilibrium channel strategy being
the optimal strategy. Some managerial insights are generated.
Sustainability 2020, 12, 113 19 of 26
6.1. Managerial Implications
There are four important managerial implications as follows: Firstly, competition degree of supply
chains affects the equilibrium results, and further affect the channel structure strategy. For both GSC
and TSC, if any one is centralized, the competitor will also choose a centralized strategy. But when
any of them is decentralized, the competitor’s strategy depends on the competition degree of the
supply chains. Further, when the competition degree is weak, CC is the only Nash equilibrium. But
when the competition degree is relatively severe, DD is also the Nash equilibrium. Secondly, the
GMMC and DSGLs are also important factors affecting the channel structure strategy of the competing
supply chains. Thirdly, whether the Nash equilibrium channel strategy is the optimal strategy for both
supply chains depends on government intervention policy. When the competition degree and the
governmental intervention policy are relatively severe, although CC is always the Nash equilibrium
of the game, it cannot make either party reach optimal profit. Hence, CC is a prisoner’s dilemma.
However, DD can make the GSC achieve its maximum profit. Fourthly, from the consumers’ viewpoint,
a CD strategy can achieve the highest green level, while a DC strategy can only achieve the lowest
green level. In addition, relatively severe governmental interventions might achieve the maximum
green level but may not realize the lowest retail price.
6.2. Limitations and Directions for Further Research
While this work adds to the growing literature on the GSCM by integrating governmental
intervention and channel competition into the models, there are also certain limitations due to some
assumptions. In reality, the demand function is more complex, especially considering the green level
and competition of the products. Our model may be extended to other forms of demand functions,
such as the product form in Choi [5]. We assume that there is one supply chain in both GSC and TSC.
Another extension is to examine the cases with multi-channels marketing on both green and traditional
products. Moreover, this work assumes deterministic demand and cost; an extension to uncertain cases
through chance-constrained programming or stochastic programming deserves more research. This
paper mainly employs analytical methods, which may be difficult to apply to complex game models.
In such cases, an evolutionary game theoretic approach may be a good alternative to simulate complex
systems, e.g., incorporating green tax, risk assessment, or social impact features with big data.
Author Contributions: D.Y. is in charge of Data curation, Methodology, and Writing-review & editing ; J.W.
is in charge of Methodology, Software, and Writing-review & editing; D.S. is in charge of Conceptualization,
Formal analysis, and Writing-review & editing. All authors have read and agreed to the published version of
the manuscript.
Funding: This paper was partly funded by: (i) Social science foundation of Jiangsu province [grant number:
19GLB003]; (ii) Excellent Doctor Program of Jiangsu Normal University [grant number: 18XWRX022]; and (iii) A
Project Funded by the Priority Academic Program Development of Jiangsu Higher Education Institutions.
Acknowledgments: The authors would like to thank the editor and four anonymous referees for their valuable
suggestions and insightful comments that have significantly improved the presentation of this paper.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflicts of interest.
Appendix A Proofs of Propositions
Proof of Proposition 1. According to Equations (7) and (8), the first-order and the second-order partial
derivatives of pigsc(pg, pt) and pitsc(pg, pt) with respect to pg and pt are as follows
∂pigsc(pg, pt)/∂pg = aρ− 2pg + bpt + (c + λ1)g− (g− g0)g0k
∂pitsc(pg, pt)/∂pt = a(1− ρ) − 2pt + bpg − λ2g + g20k
∂2pigsc(pg, pt)/∂p2g = −2 (A1)
∂2pitsc(pg, pt)/∂p2t = −2 (A2)
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By Equations (A1) and (A2), we can see that pigsc(pg, pt) and pitsc(pg, pt) are concave in pg and pt
respectively. Solving the first-order condition ∂pigsc(pg, pt)/∂pg = 0 and ∂pitsc(pg, pt)/∂pt = 0 for pg
and pt, we can get the optimal retail prices of green and traditional products as follows
pCC∗g =
(2ρ+ b(1− ρ))a + (2c + 2λ1 − bλ2 − 2kg0)g + B00
4− b2
pCC∗t =
(bρ+ 2(1− ρ))a + (bc + bλ1 − 2λ2 − bkg0)g + B00
4− b2
Proposition 1 is proved. 
Proof of Proposition 2. The first-order and the second-order partial derivatives of pigscr(wg, wt, pg, pt)
and pitscr(wg, wt, pg, pt) with respect to pg and pt are as
∂pigscr(wg, wt, pg, pt)/∂pg = aρ+ bpt − 2pg + λ1g + wg
∂pitscr(wg, wt, pg, pt)/∂pt = a(1− ρ) + bpg − 2pt − λ2g + wt
∂2pigscr(wg, wt, pg, pt)/∂p2g = −2 (A3)
∂2pitscr(wg, wt, pg, pt)/∂p2t = −2 (A4)
By Equations (A3) and (A4), we can see that pigscr(wg, wt, pg, pt) and pitscr(wg, wt, pg, pt) are
concave in pg and pt respectively. Solving the first-order condition ∂pigscr(wg, wt, pg, pt)/∂pg = 0 and
∂pitscr(wg, wt, pg, pt)/∂pt = 0 for pg and pt, we can get the optimal reaction functions of the retailers
pMMg (wt, wg) and pMMt (wt, wg).
Then, expecting the retailers’ price reactions, the manufacturers set their wholesale
prices wg and wt to maximize their profit pigscm(wg, wt, pDDg (wt, wg), pDDt (wt, wg))
and pitscm(wg, wt, pDDg (wt, wg), pDDt (wt, wg)). We rewrite them as pi
DD
gscm(wg, wt) and
piDDtscm(wg, wt) respectively.
The first-order and the second-order partial derivatives of piDDgscm(wg, wt) and piDDtscm(wg, wt) with
respect to wg and wt can be shown as
∂piDDgscm(wg, wt)/∂wg =
1
−4+b2 (−2gλ1 + bgλ2 + a(b(−1 + ρ) − 2ρ)
+(−2 + b2)(cg + g0(−g + g0)k−wg) + (2− b2)wg − bwn)
∂piDDtscm(wg, wt)/∂wt =
1
−4+b2 ((−2 + b2)g20k− bgλ1 + 2gλ2 − a(2 + (−2 + b)ρ) + 4wn − b(wg + 2bwn)
∂2piDDgscm(wg, wt)/∂w
2
g
= −2(2− b
2)
4− b2 (A5)
∂2piDDtscm(wg, wt)/∂w
2
t = −
2(2− b2)
4− b2 (A6)
By Equations (A5) and (A6) and the fact that 0 < b < 1, we can see that piDDgscm(wg, wt)
and piDDtscm(wg, wt) are concave in wg and wt respectively. Solving the first-order condition
∂piDDgscm(wg, wt)/∂wg = 0 and ∂pi
DD
tscm(wg, wt)/∂wt = 0 for wg and wt, we can get the optimal wholesale
prices of the manufacturers wMM∗g and wMM∗t . Substituting Proposition 2 (a) into p
DD
g (wt, wg) and
pDDt (wt, wg). Proposition 2 (b) is obtained. 
Proof of Proposition 3. The first-order and the second-order partial derivatives of pigscr(wg, pg, pt) and
pitsc(pg, pt) with respect to pg and pt are as follows
∂pigscr(wg, pg, pt)/∂pg = aρ+ bpt − 2pg + λ1g + wg
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∂pitsc(pg, pt)/∂pt = a(1− ρ) − 2pt + bpg + λ2g + g20k
∂2pigscr(wg, pg, pt)/∂p2g = −2 (A7)
∂2pitsc(pg, pt)/∂p2t = −2 (A8)
By Equations (A7) and (A8), we can see that pigscr(wg, pg, pt) and pitsc(pg, pt) are concave in pg and
pt respectively. Solving the first-order condition ∂pigscr(wg, pg, pt)/∂pg = 0 and ∂pitsc(pg, pt)/∂pt = 0
for pg and pt, we can get the optimal reaction functions of the retailers pDCg (wg) and pDCt (wg).
Then, expecting the retailers’ price reactions, the green manufacturers set his wholesale price wg
to maximize his profit pigscm(wg, pDCg (wg), pDCt (wg)). We rewrite them as pi
DC
gscm(wg).
The first-order and the second-order partial derivatives of piDCgscm(wg) with respect to wg are
as follows
∂piDCgscm(wg)/∂wg =
1
−4+b2 (−ab− 2cg + 2(g− g0)g0k− 2gλ1 + b(−g20k + gλ2)
+a(−2 + b)ρ+ b2(cg + g0(g− g0)k− 2wg) + 4wg)
∂2piDCgscm(wg)/∂w
2
g
= −2(2− b
2)
4− b2 (A9)
By Equation (A9) and the condition 0 < b < 1, we can see that piDCgscm(wg) is concave in wg. Solving
the first-order condition ∂piDCgscm(wg)/∂wg = 0 for wg, we can get the optimal wholesale price of green
manufacturer wDC∗g . Substituting wDC∗g into pDCg (wg) and pDCt (wg), we can easily obtain Proposition 3
(b). 
Proof of Proposition 4. The first-order and second-order partial derivatives of pigsc(pg, pt) and
pitscr(wt, pg, pt) with respect to pg and pt are as follows
∂pigsc(pg, pt)/∂pg = aρ− 2pg + bpt + (c + λ1)g− (g− g0)g0k
∂pitscr(wt, pg, pt)/∂pt = a(1− ρ) + bpg − 2pt − λ2g + wt
∂2pigscr(wg, pg, pt)/∂p2g = −2 (A10)
∂2pitsc(pg, pt)/∂p2t = −2 (A11)
By Equations (A10) and (A11), we can see that pigsc(pg, pt) and pitscr(wt, pg, pt) are concave in pg and
pt respectively. Solving the first-order condition ∂pigsc(pg, pt)/∂pg = 0 and ∂pitscr(wt, pg, pt)/∂pt = 0
for pg and pt, we can get the optimal reaction functions pCDg (wt) and pCDt (wt).
Then, expecting the price reactions, the traditional manufacturer sets his wholesale price wt to
maximize his profit pitscm(wt, pCDg (wt), pCDt (wt)). We rewrite it as pi
CD
tscm(wt).
The first-order and the second-order partial derivatives ofpiCDtscm(wt) with respect to wt are as follows
∂piCDtscm(wt)/∂wt =
1
−4+b2 (−2g20k− b(cg− (g− g0)g0k + gλ1) + 2gλ2
−a(2 + (−2 + b)ρ) + b2(g20k− 2wt) + 4wt)
∂2piCDgscm(wg)/∂w
2
g
= −2(2− b
2)
4− b2 (A12)
By Equation (A12), we can see that piCDtscm(wt) is concave in wt. Solving the first-order condition
∂piCDtscm(wt)/∂wt = 0 for wt, we can get the optimal wholesale price of green manufacturer w
CD∗
t .
Substituting wCD∗t into p
CD
g (wt) and pCDt (wt), we can easily obtain Proposition 4 (b). 
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Proof of Proposition 5. For the profits of GSC and TSC under different channel structure, we have
piCC∗gsc −piDC∗gsc = B(−2cg + 2(g− g0)g0k + b2(cg + g0(−g + g0)k) + 2gλ1 + b(g20k− gλ2) + a(b + 2ρ− bρ))
2
piCC∗nsc −piCD∗nsc = B(b2g20k + b(cg + g0(−g + g0)k) + 2gλ1 − 2(g20k− gλ2) + a(2 + (−2 + b)ρ))
2
where B1 =
(1−b2)
2(4−b2)2(2−b2) > 0. That is pi
CC∗
gsc −piDC∗gsc > 0, piCC∗nsc −piCD∗nsc > 0. Proposition 5 is obtained. 
Proof of Proposition 6. For the profits of GSC and TSC under different channel structures, we have
piDD∗gsc −piCD∗gsc = B2(8cg + 8g0(−g + g0)k + 2b4(cg + g0(−g + g0)k) − 8gλ1 + b2(−9cg + g(g− g0)g0k + 3gλ1
+b3(g20k− 2gλ2) + b(−2g20k + 6gλ2) + a(6b(−1 + ρ) − 2b3(−1 + ρ) − 8ρ+ 3b2ρ)))2
piDD∗nsc −piDC∗nsc = B2(2b4g20k + b3(cg− gg0k + g20k + 2gλ1) − 2b(cg− gg0k + g20k + 3gλ1)
+8(g20k + gλ2) − 3b2(3g20k + gλ2) + a(−8 + 3b2 + (−2 + b)(−4 + b + 2b2)ρ))2
where B2 = − 64−192b2+177b4−64b6+8b8
4(4−b2)2(2−b2)2(16−17b2+4b4)2 . It is easily obtained that b1 = 0.7705 is the unique root to the
numerator of B2 within (0, 1). Besides, when 0 ≤ b ≤ b1, there is B2 ≤ 0; when b1 < b ≤ 1, there is B2 > 0.
Proposition 6 is proved. 
Proof of Proposition 7. According to Equations (7) and (8), the first-order and the second-order partial
derivatives of pigsc(g, pg, pt) with respect to pg and g, and pitsc(g, pg, pt) with respect to pt are as follows
∂pigsc(g, pg, pt)/∂pg = aρ− 2pg + bpt + (c + λ1)g− (g− g0)g0k (A13)
∂pigsc(g, pg, pt)/∂g = (aρ− pg + bpt + λ1g)(−c + g0k) + λ1(−cg + (g− g0)g0k + pg) − µg (A14)
∂pitsc(g, pg, pt)/∂pt = a(1− ρ) − 2pt + bpg − λ2g + g20k (A15)
∂2pitsc(g, pg, pt)/∂p2t = −2
When µ > µ1 =
(λ1+kg)
2
2 is satisfied, the Hessian matrix H1 =
[ −2 c− g0k + λ1
c− g0k + λ1 −µ− 2(c− g0k)λ1
]
is negatively definitely. So, the profit pigsc(g, pg, pt) is concave in (pg, g), and pitsc(g, pg, pt) is concave in
pt. Setting Equations (A13)–(A15) to zero and solving them simultaneously, we can easily obtain the
optimal decisions.
(
gCC∗, pCC∗g , pCC∗t
)
. 
Proof of Proposition 8. Similar to the proof of Proposition 2, pigscr(g, wg, wt, pg, pt) and
pitscr(g, wg, wt, pg, pt) are concave in pg and pt respectively. Solving the first-order conditions
∂pigscr(g, wg, wt, pg, pt)/∂pg = 0 and ∂pitscr(g, wg, wt, pg, pt)/∂pt = 0 for pg and pt, we can get the
optimal price reaction functions pDDg (g, wg, wt) and pDDt (g, wg, wt).
Then, expecting the retailers’ price reactions, the manufacturers set their wholesale prices
wg, wt and green level g to maximize their profit pigscm(g, wg, wt, pDDg (g, wt, wg), pDDt (g, wt, wg))
and pitscm(g, wg, wt, pDDg (g, wt, wg), pDDt (g, wt, wg)). We rewrite them as pi
DD
gscm(g, wg, wt) and
piDDtscm(g, wg, wt) respectively.
The first-order and the second-order partial derivatives of piDDgscm(g, wg, wt) and piDDtscm(g, wg, wt)
with respect to g, wg and wt are as
∂piDDgscm(g, wg, wt)/∂wg =
1
−4+b2 (−2gλ1 + bgλ2 + a(b(−1 + ρ) − 2ρ)
+(−2 + b2)(cg + g0(−g + g0)k−wg) + (2− b2)wg − bwn) (A16)
∂piDDgscm(g, wg, wt)/∂g =
1
−4+b2 ((2λ1 − bλ2)(cg + g0(g0 − g)k−wg) + (c− g0k)
(2gλ1 − bgλ2 + a(b + 2ρ− bρ) − 2wg + b2wg + bwn)) − gµ (A17)
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∂piDDtscm(g, wg, wt)/∂wt =
1
−4+b2 ((−2 + b2)g20k− bgλ1 + 2gλ2 − a(2 + (−2 + b)ρ) + 4wn − b(wg + 2bwn) (A18)
When µ > µ2 is satisfied, the Hessian matrix H2 = − 2(2−b
2)
4−b2
2(2−b2)(c−g0k)−(2λ1−bλ2)
4−b2
2(2−b2)(c−g0k)−(2λ1−bλ2)
4−b2 −µ−
2(c−g0k)−(2λ1−bλ2)
4−b2
 is negatively definitely. So, piDDgscm(g, wg, wt)
is concave in (wg, g), and piDDtscm(g, wg, wt) is concave in wt respectively. Setting Equations (A16)–(A18)
to zero and solving them simultaneously, we can obtain the optimal decisions
(
gDD∗, wDD∗g , wDD∗t
)
.
Substituting
(
gDD∗, wDD∗g , wDD∗t
)
into pDDg (g, wg, wt) and pDDt (g, wg, wt), we can get the optimal
decisions
(
pDD∗g , pDD∗t , w
DD∗
g , wDD∗t , g
DD∗). Proposition 8 is proved. 
Proof of Proposition 9. Similar to the proof of Proposition 3, we know that pigscr(g, wg, pg, pt)
and pitsc(g, pg, pt) are concave in pg and pt respectively. By Solving the first-order condition
∂pigscr(g, wg, pg, pt)/∂pg = 0 and ∂pitsc(g, pg, pt)/∂pt = 0 for pg and pt, we can get the optimal reaction
functions of the retailers pDCg (g, wg) and pDCt (g, wg).
Then, expecting the retailers’ price reactions, the green manufacturers set his wholesale price
wg and green level g to maximize his profit pigscm(g, wg, pDCg (g, wg), pDCt (g, wg)). We rewrite it as
piDCgscm(g, wg).
The first-order partial derivatives of piDCgscm(g, wg) with respect to wg and g are as follows
∂piDCgscm(g, wg)/∂wg =
1
−4+b2 (−ab− 2cg + 2(g− g0)g0k− 2gλ1 + b(−g20k + gλ2)
+a(−2 + b)ρ+ b2(cg + g0(g− g0)k− 2wg) + 4wg)
∂piDCgscm(g, wg)/∂g =
1
−4+b2 (−a(c− g0k)(b(−1 + ρ) − 2ρ) − b2(µg− cwg + g0kwg)) + 2(2cgλ1
−2gg0kλ1 + g20kλ1 + 2µg− (c− g0k + λ1)wg) + b(c(g20k− 2gλ2) − g0k(−2gλ2 + g20k + g20λ2)) + λ2wg
According the proof of Proposition 8, when µ > µ2 is satisfied, piDDgscm(g, wg, wt) is concave in
(wg, g), and piDDtscm(g, wg, wt) is concave in wt respectively. By solving the fist-order condition, we can
obtain the optimal decisions
(
gDC∗, wDC∗g
)
. Substituting
(
gDC∗, wDC∗g
)
into pDCg (g, wg) and pDCt (g, wg),
we can get the optimal decisions
(
gDC∗, wDC∗g , pDC∗g , pDC∗t
)
. Proposition 9 is proved. 
Proof of Proposition 10. Similar to the proof of Proposition 7, we know that if µ > µ1, pigsc(g, pg, pt)
and pitscr(g, wt, pg, pt) are concave in (pg, g) and pt respectively. By Solving the first-order condition
∂pigsc(g, pg, pt)/∂pg = 0, ∂pigsc(g, pg, pt)/∂g = 0, and ∂pitscr(g, wt, pg, pt)/∂pt = 0 for pg, g and pt, we
can get the optimal reaction functions gCD(wt), pCDg (wt), and pCDt (wt).
Then, expecting the retailers’ price reactions, the traditional manufacturer set his wholesale price
wt to maximize his profit pitscm(wt, gCD(wt), pCDg (wt), pCDt (wt)). We rewrite them as pi
CD
tscm(wt).
Similar to the Proof of Proposition 4, by solving first-order and the second-order derivatives of
piCDtscm(wt) with respect to wt, and further solving the fist-order condition, we can obtain the optimal
decisions wCD∗t . Substituting w
CD∗
t into g
CD(wt), pCDg (wt), and pCDt (wt), we can get the optimal decisions(
gCD∗, wCD∗t , p
CD∗
g , pCD∗t
)
. Proposition 10 is proved. 
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